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Abstract: The changing landscape of retirement system  throughout the world presents 
many challenges for governments, employers, and participants.  The future for employees 
have dimmed with the retreat of pension plans, and the shifting of investment and 
longevity risks to ill prepared employees.  A hybridized model is created to limit the risk 
to the employer and to improve outcomes for employees who have behavioral obstacles 
to purchasing annuities at retirement.  The model is measured for employers in two 
different fashions replicating current corporate funding constraints and financial 
accounting measures.  A $3 billion company provides th  census information in which to 
test the model.  The model is also created to simulate distribution patterns utilizing the 
deferred annuity. The results show that the employer’s risk is reduced by approximately 
90% in the cost structure as compared to a traditional pension plan. We also find that 
employees can reduce their probability of total ruin by 90% using a deferred annuity at 
retirement as opposed to the typical 4% rule used in today’s financial planning world.  
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According to actuarial lore, an actuary for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Reinhard 
Hohaus may have been the originator of the term for the three-legged stool of retirement.  The 
first component of the stool was funded by the individual through private savings.  The second 
leg of the stool was an employer-sponsored arrangement, originally a defined benefit plan or 
pension plan.  The third leg of the stool was funded by the public is known in the United States as 
Social Security.  It is well known that the savings rate for individuals in the United States is very 
low.  There has been a significant drop in pension c verage for employees and Social Security 
has been stressed due to demographic shifts and longevity gains of the populace.  Since each leg 
of the stool has serious problems, new thoughts regarding retirement systems must be 
investigated.  The traditional roles of each player must be challenged and reconsidered.  This 
paper looks to provide a different perspective on the risk sharing characteristics common in 
today’s system. 
Defined benefit plans (named because the benefit at retirement is defined in advance) became the 
staple of retirement income during the United States dvancement in manufacturing during the 
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1950’s and 1960’s.  These plans faced serious challenges, including a volatile financial system, a 
mobile workforce that did not remain with one employer during their career, and expensive 
government regulation.  As a result of these changes, corporate and public plan sponsors 
disallowed new entrants from entering the plan, or fr ze the plan or simply terminated the 
arrangement.  These plans eventually were replaced with defined contribution plans (named 
because the contribution was defined in advance, but the benefit at retirement was variable).    
Defined contribution plans allow the plan sponsor to fix the cost of the plan in advance, thus 
allowing for simpler budgeting.  The employees become responsible for investing the dollars and 
ensuring that their account can last a lifetime, whereas their prior pension would have been paid 
over a lifetime.  Both defined benefit and defined contribution plans can produce similar results 
under an assumption regarding future contingent events.  However, the risks inherent within each 
system are different with the employee retaining investment risk and longevity risk in the defined 
contribution plan.  Plan sponsors retained the respon ibility for the same risks in the defined 
benefit plan. 
As a result of these issues, which are inherent in each system separately, this paper will 
investigate a new type of system that takes the best of a defined benefit plan and marries it to a 
defined contribution plan into one design.  The defined contribution approach is meant to fund the 
early years of retirement.  Once a limited time period is met, the defined benefit portion begins 
and hedges longevity risk.  The defined contribution p rtion has a finite time period to fund the 
benefits, which changes the nature of the investment portfolio and distribution pattern for the 
participant.  The defined benefit portion is mandatory and only payable if a person lives to the 
appropriate age.  Each plan works together and forms a hybrid plan.  It will be hypothesized that 
employers fare better under this arrangement than a typical defined benefit plan and employees 
will have better success through retirement income possibilities than a traditional defined 
contribution arrangement.    
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A key component to the hybridized system is the use of a longevity annuity within the scheme.  A 
longevity annuity is simply a long-dated deferred annuity, such as beginning at age 85.  
Significant research has been performed to study the effects of a longevity annuity when 
purchased by an individual at retirement to hedge their longevity risk.  Scott (2008) has shown 
that longevity annuities can assist in changing spending patterns by allowing a person to spend 
more in their earlier years when they may desire to utilize higher amounts of retirement dollars to 
travel, purchase items or whatever their desires may be.  The longevity annuity, in conjunction 
with an account balance can produce better results than attempting to deplete a lump sum payout 
when your lifetime is uncertain. 
Current research has focused on the underfunding of pension plans at the public sector level, the 
further deterioration of coverage of pension plans d its reasons, the distribution strategies at 
retirement of 401(k) balances and the use of behavior l techniques of implementing negative 
options including negative election and automatic increases.  Negative options include 
automatically enrolling participants and also automatically increasing contribution rates.  These 
are deemed negative since participants would have to n gatively elect (or fill out a form) to deny 
the application of the option.   
Recently, the distribution patterns at retirement have received some interest by modeling different 
withdrawal patterns with an eye towards minimization f risk and optimal payout schemes.  
However, the literature has been lacking in creating a model that also examines the input to the 
system, rather than the output and its effects on the sponsor.  This paper will focus on a model 
that hybridizes a defined benefit and defined contribu ion design that maximizes a result for the 
employer (the input).  This model will reduce the typical risks that sponsors bear when creating a 
retirement plan for its employees by sharing the risk in a different manner, and allowing the 
defined benefit scheme to function much like typical nsurance by covering the tail risk, rather 
than the whole retirement risk as is the case in virtually all retirement schemes. 
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The paper will hypothesize that the risk the employer shares in providing a similar type of 
retirement program that a traditional defined benefit plan provides will be significantly lower than 
providing the defined benefit plan on its own.  The m tric that will be developed in this paper will 
be calculated from a stochastic process that compares the volatility of the contribution for the 
hybridized plan and a current traditional defined benefit plan.  This measure will be called the 
Pension Efficiency Ratio.  The Pension Efficiency Ratio will have in its numerator the standard 
deviation of the contribution for the hybrid plan based upon stochastic modeling of the pension 
contributions.  The denominator will be the standard deviation of the comparative design’s 
contribution, the defined benefit only plan.  The ratio will reflect the fraction of volatility from 
one design to another. 
In addition, the paper will also hypothesize that a participant will have a better outcome than a 
simple defined contribution approach.  This will bed monstrated by modeling participant 
outcomes under a defined contribution approach against the hybridized approach.  The measure 
for this approach will be to compare the probability of ruin for the defined contribution plan 
versus the probability of ruin for the hybridized plan.  The probability of ruin will incorporate 
stochastic modeling of longevity.  
The final hypothesis will test the efficiency of the distribution pattern by researching the 
remaining account balance at death while continuing use of stochastic mortality.  It will be 
hypothesized that the hybridized approach will have  higher efficiency, with lower account 
balances at death.   
Current State of Pensions 
Before entering the current state, it is important to understand the role of pensions in our history 
and how we came to the present.  Wooten (1998) provides a history of pensions and discusses the 
rise of pensions after World War II, with the auto c mpanies leading the way in providing 
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pensions to the members of the United Auto Workers.  Packard Motor Car Company had merged 
with Studebaker in the 1950’s and had a failure of one of their pension plans when a factory was 
closed in 1958.  This termination started the process in which the UAW began educating the 
government that a termination insurance program needed to be created.  Eventually, Studebaker 
closed its last plant in South Bend, Indiana.  This event precipitated the future law called 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, or ERISA which was passed in 1974.  When 
Studebaker failed, retirees would receive all their pensions, and so would those who were 
retirement eligible and age 60.  These pensions would be provided by an insurance company.  
However, those who did not meet those eligibility requirements would receive something 
drastically different.  If the participant was vestd, they would receive 15 cents on the dollar.  
Those who were not vested received nothing. 
Many people in the industry theorized that once the ERISA Act passed, that the day of pensions 
would be short lived.  The main reason for this thought was that the flexibility that plan sponsors 
had enjoyed would now be curtailed through the imple entation of minimum funding rules.  
ERISA also hailed the creation of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which insured the 
possibility of failure of pension plans.  The cost f this insurance was not free and any pension 
plan that was subject to ERISA would have to pay these premiums.  Governmental and church 
pension plans were not necessarily subject to the law and, therefore, would not have to pay the 
annual premium (which is based on a head count and a percentage of unfunded liability). 
These pages are where you type in the title of yourchapter and add the body (text, images, etc.) 
of your thesis. To best preserve the proper formatting and margin alignment, you should do this 
one chapter at a time. On the title page of the chapter, you can type in the title of your chapter 
over the placeholder text if necessary. Then, directly under the chapter title, you can begin either 
typing in or pasting the body of your first chapter. However, on this first page, you should only 
add enough content to fill this first page. If you typed in too much content or pasted in too much 
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content so that it created another page, delete this content on the second page and backspace until 
you are back on the first page. If you do not do this, t e margins may be incorrect on the 
following pages. 
Trends 
After ERISA was passed, a downward trend in pension coverage began.  In 1980, total defined 
benefit plan coverage peaked by covering nearly 40%of all people.  This coincided with an IRS 
Code change in 1978, and further clarified in 1981, called Section 401(k) (EBRI, 2005).  At this 
point, many large companies began implementation of 401(k)’s, leading to a large increase in the 





Another measure of the trend is to see the amount of asset growth in the plans.  As might have 
been expected, there has been considerable growth in the asset position of defined contribution 








The reasons for the shift from defined benefit to defined contributions plans have been studied by 
many academics.  Munnell and Soto (2007) outlined a number of different reasons for the 
changes in retirement plan types.  They mention that the workforce was changing and the youth 
preferred the defined contribution approach.  Along with this, since the stock market was roaring, 
it made investing look easy.  They also discovered that industry was changing and large legacy 
costs were making defined benefit costs higher.  Defined benefit plans were very useful for large, 
established companies and were subject to those legacy costs.  Since high-tech firms were 
becoming more prevalent, along with their associated volatile earnings, the discretionary nature 
of the defined contribution plans was much more appe ling.  They also note the increasing costs 
of regulations, including faster vesting, minimum participation rules and PBGC guarantees that 
reduced the attractiveness of pension plans. 
Rauh and Stefanascu (2009) studied this further and co cluded that companies that were freezing 
their pension had financial difficulty and needed to improve their balance sheet.  Other companies 
made changes to their pension, such as converting to cash balance plans (another form of 
pension).  These companies, however, were financially vi ble. 
The funding position of pension plans have been improving since the market crash in 2008.  
Milliman (2014) reports that corporate pension plans re funded at 91% as of the end of January 
2014.  The actuarial assumptions regarding the funded status usually have an interest rate that 
tracks Moody AA corporate bond yields, as that rateis taken to be similar to a market equivalent.  
While pensions are settled by a lump sum rate (determin d by the Internal Revenue Service) or 
through an insurance company, the Moody’s rate is accepted by the accounting profession. 
Public sector pension plans, which do not have ERISA as the governing law, show a much 
different result.  Significant research has been developed regarding the funded status of public 
pension plans.  Many different arguments have been made regarding the proper assumptions to 
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use for determining the funding status.  Public Fund Survey (2014) calculates the funding status 
for 99 statewide systems (states may have more than one system).  Utilizing the average return 
assumption of 7.9% and a smoothed actuarial value of assets, they calculate a funding ratio of 
73% as of December 31, 2011. 
The current situation for defined contribution plans also remains murky.  Vanderhei, Holden et al. 
(2012) researched the data concerning account balances for 401(k) plans.  They found that the 
average account peaked at $65,454 in 2007 but dropped to $58,991 in 2011 after the market crash 
of 2008.  While the average balance in 1996 was $37,32 , the median balance was $11,600 in 
1996, rose to $18,942 in 2007, dropped to $12,655 in 2008, and was at $16,649 in 2012.  The 
mean and median balances demonstrate skewness, but further, also demonstrate defined 
contributions plan assets are not sufficient to support a person in retirement.  The volatility in the 
account balance may also hold some meaning to those nearing retirement.  Gustman, et. al, 
(2009) concludes that the people most affected by the change in account balance are those with 
large balances and who may be wealthier.  Therefore, they may not be nearly as impacted by the 
resulting market loss.  They also note that because of defined benefit plans, people were not as 
necessarily impacted by the 2008 crash.     
Defined Benefit or Defined Contribution? 
Is there a correct plan for the populace?  In many wa s, a defined benefit plan is a paternalistic 
benefit according to Weiss (1991).  Bodie, Marcus and Merton (1985) described the tradeoffs to 
each plan design in their National Bureau of Economics Research Working Paper.  Overall they 
view that defined benefit plans have the advantage of providing a stable income at retirement if 
their utility is related to their replacement rate.  They view defined contribution plans as savings 
plans that have value in high-inflation times.  The employees also can value the defined 
contribution plan and it is fully funded at all times.  Bodie et al. also propose that further 
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investigation should be done with plans that combine the best attributes of the defined benefit 
plan and defined contribution plan, as this paper will do.  They propose the never-used floor 
offset plan, with a defined benefit floor and the upside of a defined contribution plan.  The 
following table shows some of the advantages and disadvantages of the defined benefit and 
defined contribution plan. 
Table 1 
DB Pros to the Employer DB Cons to the Employer 
Excess investment return lowers contribution Negative returns increases the contribution 
Higher than expected mortality rates reduces the 
contribution 
Costs of administration 
Able to discount for future withdrawal 
decrements 
Longevity risk 
Can provide early retirement incentives Contribution volatility 
 DB Pros to the Employee DB Cons to the Employee 
Predictable benefit stream Do not benefit from investment gains 
No investment risk Lack of understanding of benefit 
Insured by the government Generally not a portable benefit 
 DC Pros to the Employer DC Pros to the Employee 
Determinable cost Easily understood 
Portable benefit 
 DC Cons to the Employer DC Cons to the Employee 
Difficult to provide an incentive to retire Must bear investment risk 




Poterba, Rauh, et. al. (2007) examined retirement wealth accruals for both defined benefit and 
defined contribution plans.  They found that private sector defined benefit plans produced lower 
retirement wealth than defined contribution plans but were less likely to have very low retirement 
wealth incomes.  This result was explained by the diff rent asset allocations that could be utilized 
in the defined contribution plan.  High concentration n fixed income would reduce the wealth in 
the defined contribution plan.  The governmental side produced similar results if the individual in 
the defined contribution plan invested heavily into equities.  If a person is a risk-averse investor, 
the defined benefit plans produce much larger results.  It should be noted that the richer formula 
provided by governmental entities provide higher wealth than the private sector 
An interesting question is what plan does a person choose when provided an option between 
defined benefit and defined contribution plans?  Clark and Pitts (1999) studied a university plan 
to research this question.  In this study, new university employees were given a choice between 
the two types of plans.  They found that the choices followed the theory that people will choose 
the plan based upon future events and their own preferences.  Older new hires chose the defined 
benefit plan and the rest strongly chose the defined contribution plans.  They found that the most 
significant reason was the possibility of mobility in the position and whether the benefit would be 
portable in a job change. 
This was also studied internationally by Cocco and Lopes (2011).  They found that those who are 
on the fast track for earnings growth choose final average pay defined benefit plans.  If a person 
has higher income risk, they may choose the defined contribution plan.  They also found similar 
results to Clark and Pitts regarding those who expected to be mobile in their job.  These tended to 
choose defined contribution schemes. 
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Overall, there are many reasons to select either the defined benefit or defined contribution plans.  
A person’s pay, job prospects, mobility, risk profile, type of employer, etc. all are variables that 









The Purpose of Pensions 
As has been shown earlier, pensions have played an important part in employees’ careers with 
their companies.  This section will discuss two different economic theories including the 
formation of pensions using annuities and the implicit labor contract.   
Annuity Theory 
ERISA and Internal Revenue Code Section 401(a)(11) require that defined benefit plans offer 
annuities as the default choice.  If a participant is married, the default choice includes coverage 
for the spouse should the participant decease.  However, plans may allow participants to choose a 
lump sum, but that is at the sole discretion of the plan sponsor.  There is a theoretical argument to 
providing a life annuity at retirement. 
The original research on this matter is presented by Yaari (1965).  Yaari studied the effect of 
choosing an annuity in regard to theory of the lifecycle consumer.  His report examined the role 




He found that annuities are a preferable choice to financial assets. Important to this analysis was 
the additional constraint regarding an uncertain lifetime.  The three important assumptions he 
made were: 
a. Investor maximizes their expected utility  
b. All markets are complete. 
c. Markets are frictionless and actuarial pricing is fair. 
 
Davidoff et.al. (2005) furthered this research and relaxed several assumptions, including an 
actuarially fair assumption and confirmed Yaari’s fndings.  This research was completed with an 
eye towards reasons why the annuity markets are not as developed as one would expect.  They 
suggest that the reasons could be behavioral in nature. 
Implicit Contract Theory 
Why do pensions exist?  Is it an agreement between orkers and their employer for lower wages 
in exchange for deferred compensation? 
Blinder (1982) attempts to define why pensions exist and discusses how classical economic 
theory is related to pensions.  He demonstrates, under a Modigliani Miller Theorem for pensions, 
a neutrality of pensions.  Under this approach, a dollar of income is no different than a dollar of 
savings.  The five key assumptions are: 
a. There is no uncertainty of any kind 
b. There are no taxes, no governmentally imposed-pension ystem, or no laws regarding 
private pensions 
c. Capital markets are perfect 
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d. Every worker is paid fairly (implicit in this approach is a defined contribution retirement 
plan) 
 e. No job has compulsory retirement 
 
Blinder concludes that pension plans exist because of the tax advantages and the ability to reduce 
employee turnover.  He also believed Social Security exists to redistribute income among the 
populace and provide a safer vehicle for saving.  He ends with a question regarding why was the 
private system prior to Social Security non-existent, but after World War II it become a large part 
of society? 
Another explanation is proposed by the legal theory of pensions where the amount accrued to 
date is what is important.  Sharpe (1976) examined th  effects of funding a pension plan under 
three different scenarios: 1) No insurance covering the risk of the pension plan and corporation 
failing, 2) partial insurance coverage and 3) complete coverage for the failure of the pension plan.  
The last scenario was developed in response to the formation of the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation in its role as government role insurer.  Sharpe concluded that in the presence of 
insurance, the pension model doesn’t present much of a risk to workers, therefore they may not be 
considered bondholders in the corporation. 
Bulow (1982) argues against an “implicit labor contrac ”.  The implicit contract he discusses 
involves the promise of inflation protection while working, which is demonstrated by a typical 
final average pay pension plan where the benefit is based upon pay at retirement versus current 
pay.  Implicit in this argument is whether younger p ople are accepting a lower pension accrual 
(therefore lower total pay) versus older people who have higher pension accruals.  Bulow argues 
for the accrued benefit and resulting legal theory of pensions, that only the benefits earned to date 
are important in the analysis of the firm.  Both Bulow and Sharpe argue that the plans can be 
terminated at any time with only the resultant accrued benefit being paid. 
25 
 
Implicit contract theory as stated by Ippolito (1985) views pensions in the context of the 
employer’s balance sheet and the resultant claims that can be made.  He uses prior research from 
Treynor (1977) arguing the pension must be looked at in context with the firm, rather than in 
isolation, as most actuaries perform their analysis.  The implicit contract theory states employees 
view their compensation package in total, and pensions provide a reason to complete their career 
with their employer.  The pension provides an incentiv  (due to its final average pay component) 
to have the employee “save” earlier.  Another conclusion is that pension liabilities are larger due 
to the recognition of the complete career, essentially quantifying the final average pay into the 
liability of the pension.  Ippolito found employees who were covered by a pension did have 
longer tenure than those that were not covered by a pension, thus showing that there is value that 
must be accounted for in the typical final pay scheme.  The conclusion is that using nominal 
interest rates, rather than rates adjusted for inflat on, would show underfunded pension plans 
versus overfunded pensions.  Ultimately, the pension participants become bondholders to the 
company and since pensions accounted for approximately 25% of the equity value of companies, 
the stock price of the company is affected.  Ippolito (1987) shows more data supporting the 
implicit contract theory and Lazear (1990) confirms the turnover results, when pensions are in 
place. 
Pension Pitfalls 
Pension plans and their effect on corporations and governmental entities have been a large part of 
media coverage over the last decade due to high profile failures and underfunding after the 
market crash of 2008.  This section will summarize a number of the issues that pensions face. 
Intergenerational Wealth Transfers 
Currently, the unfunded condition of many municipal ension plans are an issue.  Early work on 
the thoughts regarding funding led to a theoretical framework regarding the necessity of funding a 
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governmental pension plan.  Initially, Samuelson (1958) tackled the problem by examining how 
individuals would save for retirement.  He found that this would be difficult and therefore, the 
younger generations must make a compact with the old r generation to solve their retirement 
income issue.  This would be done with the knowledge that future generations would fund the 
current generation.  Thus, the idea of a social compact exchange across generations was 
established.  He concludes all generations are bettr off. 
 Aaron (1966) researched implicit returns on reserves for governmental pensions and found that if 
the sums of the rate of growth of wages and of the growth of population exceeded investment 
returns, there would be no need to fund governmental pensions.  Breyer (1989) further reviewed 
this system and determined that if a pay as you go system is replaced by a funded system, you 
cannot make whole those pensioners in transition without negatively impacting a future 
generation.  Homburg (1990) showed that the assumption of lump sum taxes are key to that 
design.  Should taxes be levied on a flat rate basis, the scheme can become efficient.  Brunner 
(1996) challenged this work by changing the assumptions of the generations to a more realistic 
group and found that the transition to a funded system creates intergenerational redistribution of 
wealth.  Rauh and Novy-Marx (2008) in their analysis of intergenerational transfers state that 
simply prefunding and investing in equities to achieve a higher rate of return does not 
automatically reduce future generations’ burden of supporting the past.  They also cite the case of 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and its recent decision to enter the equity markets. 
They argue that because the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation will be funding bankrupt 
companies’ pensions, they should be short the market, not long.  Finally, Findley and Caliendo 
(2008) discuss that if the internal rate of return of an unfunded system is less than the market 
return, some consumers may still succeed due to their lack of ability to estimate their benefits.  
They concluded that the results are mixed on whether the unfunded pension may produce better 
results when earning a lower market rate and attemped to offer behavioral reasons. 
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A different line of research regarding government funding was created by Asimakopolous and 
Weldon (1968) as they built models to examine the economic view that trust funds are not 
necessary for governmental pension plans.  They also discuss how governmental pension plans 
are not developed to determine a future retirement income for a group, but to redistribute current 
income among the collective group.  They develop a social welfare function that may subdivide 
the population into groups with different preferencs.  Overall, they conclude that governmental 
savings represent a collective activity.  Weldon (1976) followed up the paper with a discussion 
confirming that there truly is a theory on intergenerational transfers.  The issue becomes that the 
test periods are over generations that forgo the ability to set appropriate assumptions.  
Asimakapolous (1980) followed up this with further commentary that the future is uncertain and 
that economic theory must recognize this uncertainty for public pension plans.  He also disputes 
Samuelson’s (1958) results by postulating that classic l economics fails by the lack of 
assumptions regarding the future. 
Some municipalities have funded their pensions on apay as you go basis, but most have set aside 
reserves to cover the future contingent liabilities.  Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) recently 
commented on the underfunding of municipalities, but that is not necessarily news as many are 
very aware of the problems facing governmental entiti s, including Detroit.  Epple and Schipper 
(1981) had studied the underfunding of governmental pensions and attempted to research an 
answer.  Their first conclusion was that the immediate compensation of municipal employees was 
increasing, which ultimately led to higher pension costs.  They also postulate that with the baby 
boom generation producing a bulge of the cohort of children, the need for governmental services 
has increased faster than the tax base of the population, thus creating an underfunded situation.  
They believed that the costs would decline as the sc ool-aged childrens’ population declines. 
On a worldwide basis, the treatment of funding pension plans was studied by Barr and Diamond 
(2010).  They developed a three-tier system that reflect d the type of country that sponsored a 
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plan.  A first-tier country would be industrialized and fund a contributory pension with relieving 
poverty as the goal; a second-tier country would folow different schemes including pension and 
defined contribution arrangements.  The third-tier would fund a pension that may initially operate 
on a pay as you go basis until growth allows a funded form of retirement.  They also state that 
economic theory shows that pension systems have multiple objectives, there is no perfect system 
and the move to fund the plan must be carefully made as there is no right answer. 
Effect of Regulation 
Pensions have been regulated since 1875 with the Amrican Express Company forming the first 
private pension plan (EBRI, website).  The culmination of regulation was the passage of ERISA 
in 1974 as mentioned in the Introduction.  At least 23 additional Acts were passed since ERISA, 
even before reaching the 21st century.  Many of these regulations were imposed to provide either 
different benefits to employees or to reduce the risk of failure of the pension.  However, 
intermingled within the regulation was also a notion that affected the tax collection of the 
government.  For example, the highway funding bill of 2012 relaxed contributions to pension 
plans, which increased revenue to the government due to lower tax deductions.  There is a 
question of how regulations affected pension plans. 
As shown earlier in Table 1, there is a trend from defined benefit to defined contribution plans.  
Gustmann and Steinmeier (1992) analyzed this issue and found through testing Form 5500 data, 
that at least 50% of the shift has been because of trends in industry, firm size and unionization 
status.  Regulation has been a part of this change, but not the majority.  Ippolito (1988) also found 
the same results and also concluded that a large part of the shift was the creation of section 401(k) 
of the Internal Revenue Code (which is a regulation). 
Ostaszewski (2001) tested governmental regulation effects versus other effects, including New 
Economic Theory (which says that employees view their whole benefit package including health 
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care in total) and Risk Averse Employer Theory (which says that employers wanted to reduce 
their risk).  In his analysis, as opposed to common laymen thought, the New Economic Theory 
provided the highest level of explanation for the shift of companies to defined contribution 
approaches from defined benefit approach.  The effect of regulation was shown to be negligible in 
relationship to the reduction in pension coverage. 
For the studies that have been done in regard to the shift, the general consensus is that 
government regulation was not the cause of the shift, but the changing landscape of the employer 
drove the change to defined contribution plans. 
Impact on Plan Sponsors 
A pension plan can affect many different aspects of the plan sponsor, including cash flow, equity 
valuation, debt issuance and compensation for employees across all age bands (Bulow et. al. 
1985).  The highest level problem and risk that the plan sponsor may face would be bankruptcy, 
as was seen by Stockton, California, Detroit, Michigan, the State of Illinois and all the large steel 
mills, airlines and automotive manufacturers.   
Rauh (2008) examined how plan sponsors invested pension assets in relationship to the financial 
viability of the plan sponsor.  He found that plan sponsors became less risky as their financial 
condition worsened.  This was interesting as many might expect that as a plan sponsor was closer 
to bankruptcy, the riskier the plan sponsor might behave. 
Corporate debt ratings are important when companies ne d to issue debt.  Carroll and Niehaus 
(1998) found that underfunded pension plans affected th  bond rating more than an overfunded 
pension plan.  They attributed this to the fact in an asset reversion for a terminated overfunded 




Bader (2004) makes the argument that in many ways (in absence of a governmental guarantee 
system) the plan sponsor is borrowing from the employee for the underfunded pension plan.  An 
example of this could be Detroit as the pensioners may well be treated like any other bondholder 
and take a “haircut” for the underfunding of the plan. 
Underfunding 
Since pension plans are a promise to pay a benefit i  the future, corporations are required to 
contribute assets in order to fund these promises.  Governmental entities are exempted under 
ERISA to fund these obligations.  However, as has already been noted, the underfunding of the 
plan has ramifications to corporations in their stock price and ability to issue debt.  Governmental 
entities also are affected by the underfunding by the ability to issue debt as well.  The next two 
sections will outline the effects of the underfunding for these organizations. 
Public-Sponsored Pensions 
The funding level of public pensions has received srious media scrutiny.  However, the true 
level of the funding has historically been somewhat opaque.  Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009) and 
(2011) use a different methodology to determine the int rest rate in calculating funded status.  
Using zero coupon Treasury bills as the interest rate, they calculate a 43% funding level as of 
June 2009.  Brown and Wilcox (2009) concur on the us of the risk-free rate, as the cash flows 
are riskless due to constitutional constraints.  The Novy-Marx and Rauh methodology does not 
take into consideration pay inflation, which corporations are required to acknowledge.  This 
would make the funding status of governmental pension plans worse than the 43% level.  Overall, 
the underfunding may approach $3 trillion. 
Brown, Clarke and Rauh (2011) examined the reasons of how the public sector became more 
underfunded than their corporate counterparts.  They state that the public sector plans utilized 
higher equity allocations that often exceeded 70% of assets.  They also mention that public sector 
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plans failed to make the necessary contributions suggested by actuaries.  ERISA does not apply to 
public sector plans and the minimum funding standards for corporate do not exist in the public 
sector world.  Thirdly, they note that public sector plans made benefit improvements during good 
times and no corresponding reductions in benefits in bad times.  Verbon (1987) also noted the 
increase in benefit levels internationally in the same context.  These reasons combined to produce 
the lower funding status.  Finally, they note that defined contribution plans are becoming more 
prevalent for governmentals than in the past. 
Private (Corporate)-Sponsored Pensions 
An underfunded pension plan impacts many facets of he plan sponsor.  Since cash contributions 
are mandatory under the Internal Revenue Code, the ability to generate cash is important.  Also, 
as a pension plan can be under or over funded, the balance sheet of the organization is also 
affected.  This can affect the corporation’s ability to issue a bond or may affect its stock price.      
Rauh (2006) analyzed corporation’s ability to make capital expenditures when faced with 
mandatory pension contributions and found that the pensions did limit capital expenditures.  He 
also found that firms that did not have pension plans were able to spend more on capital 
expenditures than their counterparts with pension pla s. 
Studies have been done by Feldstein and Seligman (1981), Bulow, Morck and Summers (1985) 
and Jin, Merton and Bodie (2006) that show that a firm’s stock price is impacted by the valuation 
of its under or overfunded pension plan.  They note difficulty in the ability of translating through 
opaque accounting numbers and also mention that firm’s values do drop by a $1 per $1 increase 
in liability but not necessarily the same $1 per $1 per asset value as the assets cannot revert to the
employer. 
The tax status of the employer may have some relationsh p to defined benefit selection and 
funding.  Thomas (1987) showed that if an employer had a higher tax rate, they were more likely 
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to have a pension plan and also more likely to contribute a higher amount.  Higher taxed entities 
also had higher levels of funding and used more conservative assumptions.    
Finally, does the presence of a pension affect the firm’s capital structure?  Shivdasani and 
Stefenescu (2010) showed that companies are more levered when considering their pension 
obligations directly on the balance sheet.  They asked the question of why companies do not lever 
up to the point where the marginal tax rate starts declining.  This may be answered in regard to 
debt conservativeness by the presence of a pension.  Once that is considered, the employer feels 
that it may have enough debt. 
Shift to Defined Contribution Plans 
The shift to defined contribution plans has been unmistakable.  Towers Watson, an actuarial 




The shift has implications for both the employer and the employee.  The following section details 





Effect on Plan Sponsors 
Bodie (1985) , EBRI (2005), among others have discus ed how the pension risks shift from the 
employer to the employee in the defined contribution world.  Since the contributions are variable, 
corporations can now define their costs in advance (much like wages) and be able to budget more 
realistically.  Obviously, this is better from stric ly a financial perspective for the employer.  
Rubin (2007) found that freezing a pension and presumably switching to a defined contribution 
boosted firm value, though on a deferred basis.  Comprix and Mueller (2011) found that 
employers had a downward bias in their accounting assumptions in order to stress the cost of the 
pension.  They also found that earnings were immediat ly impacted. 
There are other hidden aspects however, to this change.  Ghilarducci and Sun (2006) examined 
Form 5500 information to determine employer costs in regard to the shifting of the retirement 
benefit.  The administrative costs to provide the defined contribution benefit are generally 
smaller, due to the lack of an actuary and also the PBGC premiums.  Investment expenses were 
not accounted for in this analysis.  Also, the study did not account for hidden revenue sharing 
which is buried in the expense ratio that subsidizes recordkeeping costs.  They did mention that 
there has been a significant shifting in costs to the employee.  In a defined benefit plan, the 
employer bears all the investment costs and administration costs since the benefit to the 
participant must be paid in whole.  In the defined contribution world however, the benefit is 
adjusted for the cost and the employers have been tr nding towards having the participants pay 
for the cost.  The participants certainly do pay for the cost of the investment expenses in the plan.  
In total, employers are reducing their support for c sts of retirement plans. 
EBRI (2013) studies retirement confidence and has seen continued drop in worker confidence for 
retirement, even under better economic conditions.  This may have negative impacts for 
employers as employees may work longer than the employer may want.  Later retirement ages 
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may have some advantages including productivity, but the older ages have costs associated with 
them (Munnell, Sass and Soto, 2006). 
Effect on Beneficiaries 
In the past, employees who were covered by pensions did not have to have any skills for 
retirement planning.  They did not have to sign up for the plan, they did not have to manage any 
assets, they did not have to compute what was necessary for their retirement and when they did 
retire, they simply received a check each month.  In the defined contribution world, the employee 
now has to decide how much to save, choose the proper investments, take out the appropriate 
dollars at retirement and somehow ensure that the pot of money was not exhausted before they 
died.  Employees now need to become financial accountants, investment experts, actuaries and 
finally financial planners.  Is this even possible? 
Shift of Investment Risk 
The shifting of the investment making decision is one of monumental shifts in retirement plans.  
There has been research on the optimal methods of portfolio creation for those in defined 
contribution plans.  Haberman and Vigna (2002) conclude that risk averse employees should be 
in investments which reduce equity exposure over time.  Risk neutral employees should stay in 
risky assets for the full working career and never move out of them until retirement.  Emms 
(2012) provides a similar model with annuitization  the back end.  Both of these methods are 
similar to target date funds which are now prevalent within the defined contribution world, and 
viewed as solution to the investment risk. 
Significant amount of research has been performed on target date funds including Bodie (2001) 
and Bodie (2007).  He found that target date funds perform reasonably well, but also believed that 
there is further optimization necessary.  He devised other methodologies to account for different 
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levels of risk aversion within a cohort and also suggested a hump like glide path versus a linear 
path. 
In total return does a defined contribution plan produce better or worse results than a pension?  
Towers Watson (2013) examined returns from 1995 to 2011.  This time period had significant 
market gains along with significant market losses.  Their analysis showed that defined benefit 
plans produced an average 76 basis point excess return over this time period.  The last five years, 
however, produced only a 39 basis excess return.  The study also showed a dramatic reduction in 
equity exposure for defined plans over the last five year as opposed to defined contribution plans 
with defined contribution plans holding 14% more equity than defined benefit plans.  The report 
also showed that the average fees for defined contribution fees for investments was 65 basis 
points, and completely paid for by the employee.   Note that Towers database primarily included 
larger employers with lower fees.  Olsen (2014) notes that defined benefit plans spend 43.7 basis 
points on investment managers. 
Shift of Longevity Risk 
Longevity risk is the risk that the participant would bear in regard to their life expectancy.  As 
Laibson et. al. (2002) note, most defined contribution plans offer a lump sum as the standard 
choice in retirement as opposed to defined benefit plans which must offer an annuity.  As 
mentioned earlier, Yaari (1965) showed that risk averse people would prefer annuities since it 
produces a higher utility.  Behavioral forces could be responsible for people who do not to choose 
this option.  Currently, advisors tell their clients to predominately use the 4% rule in retirement 
(Sun and Webb, 2012).  This method, which says to spend 4% of the account each year, is 
assured to leave 96% of holdings in the final year. 
Zelinsky (2004) summarizes the other risks with annuitizing the account balance in order to 
ameliorate this risk.  The issues that a participant could face include understanding the pricing of 
36 
 
the product, health of the insurer, interest rate environment, locking in the benefit at an 
inopportune time, etc.  This becomes a difficult decision for the employee. 
Madsen and Tans (2012) propose another method to counter the longevity risk, by having an 
equilibrium retirement age.  This age is individual specific and takes into account the current 
wealth of the participant and also the needs at retirement in order to have a floating retirement 
age.     
Watson (2008) makes the argument that while defined contribution schemes may inject longevity 
risk to the employee, a defined benefit employee is subject to firm specific risk and that the 
pension plan may go bankrupt and the retiree may lose a significant balance.  While this may be 
true, there are other factors at play including government insurance. 
MacMinn et. al. (2006) once again make the argument along with Brown (2000) and Brown 
(2007) that annuities are simply the best way to hedge longevity risk.  Unfortunately, the 
populace does not agree given the sales of annuities. 
There is no question that longevity risk is a signif cant risk that defined contribution plans 
transfer to the employee, rather than having a defined benefit plan bearing that risk, but there is a 
solution, and it is in the insurance market.  It is simply unused. 
Alternative Pension Models 
As McFarland of Towers Watson (2013) has reported, here has been a dramatic shift from 
traditional defined benefit plans to either a hybrid approach or defined contribution only type of 
plans.  Typical hybrid approaches include a cash balance design which provides a notional 
account balance within a defined benefit plan (Laibson 2004) or a pension equity design which 
defines a final average pay lump sum in advance (Gren 2003).  Advances in defined contribution 
designs include age weighted profit sharing accounts with larger allocations to older workers and 
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new comparability designs which also drive larger alloc tions typically to highly compensated 
employees (Laibson 2004). 
Cash balance plans were primarily developed in response to employers demanding a retirement 
product that would accommodate a mobile workforce, and also stress the numerical value of the 
retirement benefit in an easy to understand fashion (Clark and Schieber, 2004).  A cash balance 
account is hypothetically created to appear to be similar to a defined contribution account, with a 
pay credit each year to be contributed and an interes  amount to be added to the account.  It would 
not be uncommon that a participant would receive a 5% of pay credit and an interest rate related 
to one year treasuries.  The benefit is guaranteed, hus a defined benefit component.  Employees 
supposedly liked to know the value of the benefit and lso the opportunity to take the benefit and 
roll the pension over when they terminated employment.  Employers were attracted to the benefit 
simply because it generated a cost savings since the assets were earning greater rates of return 
than the amount being credited to the employee.  Also, another attractive feature included the 
lump sum benefit which would then remove an overhanging liability of retirees that ultimately 
threatened the airlines and manufacturers.  Harper and Treanor (2014) hypothesized that wealth 
transfer and the tax situation of the firm also figured into the decision to convert the plans into 
cash balance plans.  The Fortune 100 essentially adopte  this model, but it wasn’t without 
controversy since IBM engineers calculated the before and after benefits and discovered a 
reduction in benefit for their plan.  This prompted an unsuccessful lawsuit, and ultimately a 
freezing of the plan for IBM. 
Green (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2003) shows that a number of large employers switched to 
pension equity plans.  This type of hybrid plan also shows a notional balance but the increase in 
balance each year is tied to actuarial factors, andthus not as easy for the participant to 
understand.  Only about 1% of large plan employees were in this type of design. 
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There have been other approaches developed including the aforementioned cash balance plans, a 
risk averse defined benefit plan called Green DB from Vanguard as written by Inglis (2011) and 
the next generation defined contribution plan written by Vernon (2013).  The Green DB plan 
involves changing the funding mechanism in pensions t  a bondlike liability driven approach to 
protect against interest rate fluctuations, and Vernon’s defined contribution designs include 
annuity purchases at retirement.  Both of these designs do not fundamentally change the inherent 
disadvantages of defined benefit and defined contribution plans. 
The new comparability and age weighted designs for defined contribution plans were generally 
developed to allow for a more defined benefit like accrual rather than a simple level percent of 
pay allocation in defined contribution plans.  These designs became prevalent when the plan 
sponsor would freeze the pension plan and then convert to a defined contribution plan.  It was 
meant to keep the person whole, rather than taking a reduction in their benefit.     
Overall, the different designs that have been developed do not change the nature of the landscape 
in regard to the employee and the employer.  Cash blance plans and pension equity plans still 
have the same pitfalls as other pension plans, theyjust simply look more attractive to the 
employee.  The defined contribution designs reallocted money from some people and gave more 










This paper investigates turning the hybridization technique upside down, by changing the risk 
sharing mechanisms within each plan.  Currently, both the pension and defined contribution 
approaches share a distribution model that begins when the employee actually retires.  This paper 
will change that model to having the defined contribution plan begin payment first, and having 
the defined benefit plan begin payment later. 
Role of Annuities 
Annuities form the basis of many pension plans, thoug  they are allowed to offer a lump sum 
equivalent which is actuarially calculated under statutory rules for private pension plans.  Defined 
contribution plans, however, do not offer annuities in any significant fashion (Kiplinger (2012)).  
However, given Yaari’s view regarding annuities being an optimal solution when facing an 
uncertain lifetime, it could be expected that annuities are the payment form of choice 
when a person retires, since they can certainly annuitize outside the 401(k) in an IRA.  
This does not happen.  Before examining the reasons, a discussion on prospect theory 
would be appropriate. 
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced prospect theory, a theory which proposes that people 
do not necessarily make decisions under classical utility theory.  Generally, it has been 
understood that a risk averse decision maker would have a concave utility function.  Kahneman 
and Tversky introduced the concept of a reference point and that the reference point could change 
the utility function from a risk averse status to a risk seeking status.  Specifically they noted how 
people make decisions regarding gains and losses, and people tend to be risk averse on gains, and 




They also performed experiments and attempted to ascert in how people view probabilistic 
events at the short end of the probability distribuion or the tail end of the distribution.  From their 
work, the found that people overestimate low probability events and underestimate high 




    
Kahneman and Tversky (1992) along with editorial commentary from the Journal of Behavioral 
Finance (2003) summarize the phenomena of choice with evidence from experiments into the 
following five results (all stemming from behavior): 
1. Framing effects: people make choices based upon how they are framed, versus 
typical theory which would not account for framing. 
2. Nonlinear preferences: The expectation principle says that the utility of risky 
choices is linear in outcome probabilities.  However, it has been shown that people view 




3. Source dependence-the source of the bet is important as people are willing to bet 
in their area of expertise. 
4. Risk seeking-people make risk-seeking bets such as lotteries, when the bet 
seemingly unwinnable, and they will also assume a risk-seeking position regarding 
losses, when a loss may be certain. 
5. Loss aversion-losses are larger than gains. 
From this theory, the next step is to understand how people make the choices to annuitize or not 
to annuitize their wealth at retirement.  As Yaari mentioned and Benartzi et. al (2012) agree, it 
would seem that the rational choice under an uncertain lifetime would be to annuitize the full 
amount.  However the real evidence shows that this does not occur.  Schmidt (2012) furthered 
research by seeing the impact of prospect theory for insurance and saw that people’s final wealth 
was important as the reference point for determinatio  of whether to purchase insurance or not. 
Hu and Scott (2007) note that basically no full annuitization occurs in the real market outside of 
defined benefit plans and Social Security.  Bannerjee (2013) also shows low annuitization in 
defined benefit plans when the option to lump sum is given.  Hu and Scott recount Ellsberg’s 
(1961) work that people prefer risky bets versus uncertain bets (where the probabilities are 
unknown).  From Hu and Scott’s work, they explain that many people do not choose annuities 
because of behavioral issues and certain advances i the market, such as variable annuities, may 
reduce the ability to frame annuities (specifically longevity annuities) as an appropriate device.  
They also conclude that prospect theory, with its overweighting of small probabilistic event 
choices, may help in assisting people choose longevity annuities.  This will be discussed later. 
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Brown (2007) notes that behavioral economics has not addressed the annuity decision in the 
literature and hypothesizes a number of different rasons for low annuity demand.  These reasons 
are similar to Hu and Scott, and are grounded in prospect theory.  He also discussed the use of 
default options in 401(k) plans and the advantages of longevity annuities.  Using a longevity 
annuity as the default would reduce the probability that people would not choose the longevity 
annuity.  Gazzale, et.al, (2012) confirm the behavioral biases and their effect on annuity market 
demand.  They also make the argument that framing the decision can significantly change annuity 
purchase behavior in retirement. 
Purcal and Piggot (2012) built a model to explain internationally the low demand for annuities 
and concluded that bequest motives, high insurance loadings making annuities expensive and the 
prevalence of social security in countries all contributed to low demand of annuities.  Bryck and 
Montminy (2012) found that the main reason to purchase an annuity for retirees was to 
supplement social security.  Scott, Watson and Hu (2011) examined many different reasons for 
low annuity demand and concluded that annuity purchases should only happen when the 
mortality discount exceeds insurance company expenses.  Since mortality discounts are lower at 
younger ages, this would represent a problem for younger retirees and their choice to annuitize. 
The Society of Actuaries, through a study by DiCenzenzo et.al (2011) showed that annuity 
decisions could be influenced by providing factual information including life expectancies.  This 
could change their reference from an uncertain lifetim  to a risky lifetime and they may make a 
different choice.  They also found that those who had knowledge of annuities, were more likely to 
choose annuities, confirming source dependence by Kahneman and Tversky.   Gazzale, 
Mackenzie and Walker (2012) also showed that if life annuities were provided as the default and 
listed first when given an option of lump sums, annuity choices were influenced with an increase 
in choice of annuity. 
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A review of the literature shows that current thinking involves the behavioral biases of the 
population have limited the role of annuities in retirement.  A system which does not allow the 
behavioral bias into the annuity decision may have  different current result than seen in the 
marketplace today.  The next area to be examined is the role of the longevity annuity and its 
application in retirement. 
The key to the hybridized model is the concept of a longevity annuity.  A longevity annuity is 
simply a life annuity with a deferred payout date with no death benefit.  In practice, a deferred 
annuity to age 85 is a common age to defer payments, as will be demonstrated in the next 
paragraphs.  One concept that would be important to understand is the idea of a tontine.  
Milevsky and Salisbury (2013) describe the historical tontines and future tontine improvements.  
In 1693, the British parliament passed the Million Act which attempted to raise funds to pay for a 
war against France.  In this case, investors would p rchase a share and dividends would occur as 
long as the person was alive.  Essentially, the dividends were paid from deceased people’s shares.  
Prior to this Lorenzo de Tonti (from whom the name came from) had designed other forms of the 
tontine.  In its simplest form, assume 100 people of age 80 invested $100 into the tontine, with 
the payoff being splitting the investment of anyone deceased.  If the probability of dying was 
10% for this age group, you would receive a dividend of $11 (10 people dying at $100 split 
among 90 survivors) for a return of 11%.  This is es entially how annuities are calculated and 
create a significant return at the older ages when t  probabilities for death are high.  Younger 
ages do not produce the same desired results.  As anti- election started occurring (meaning some 
people remaining in the tontine might force the issue of death for the remainder, through say 
murder), tontines became outlawed.  However, they produce an insight into annuities. 
Stephenson (1978) demonstrated different facets in his paper called the High Protection Annuity.  
In his paper, he presented a few options to provide protection at minimal cost for someone who 
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retired at age 65.  The basic math behind annuities shows that those who die early subsidize those 
who die later.  He creates a protection metric thatmeasures the amount of premium transferred 
from one risk pool to another as a function of the pr mium payment.  For a straight deferred 
annuity purchased at age 65 and payable at age 85, he shows that the present value of the gain 
begins at age 78.  In other words, those who expect to live from age 78 onward would benefit and 
be protected, though a high protection metric. 
Milevsky (2005) furthers the concept and creates a term called Advanced Life Delayed Annuities 
(ALDA).  This type of annuity is funded individually over time, has an inflation component and 
payable at a later date.  The paper points out that the mortality credits (essentially the probability 
of death) functions similarly to investment return.  This is the basis for annuity calculations.  One 
of his main points is that “At advanced ages nothing beats the implied yield from a payout 
annuity”.  Using his calculations, the extra return at age 85 is 725 basis points.  Milevsky, et. al. 
(2007) furthers this research and shows that annuitization should rarely begin before age 70.  
Huang, et.al (2013) created a new concept with the ruin contingent life annuity with payouts 
when the portfolio index is ruined.  It is an option embedded in many variable annuity policies. 
Furthering the research within the ALDA is Gong (2010) In addition to confirming the details of 
the calculations and benefits of the longevity annuity, he also modeled utilizing the annuity as a 
default for high mortality households.  The losses for the longevity annuity were a fraction of 
those purchased as immediate annuities. 
The longevity annuity has a special ramification as it deals with the decumulation phase of 
retirement.  Cremer and Pestieu (2010) note that much of the literature has focused on the 
importance of accumulating assets for retirement, bu  the role of the decumulation phase is 
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equally important.  Sun and Webb (2012) describe the three typical methods of decumulation 
phase: 
1. Spend interest only, this process works for wealthy people and those willing to 
bequest the whole principal, but certainly is not effici nt over a lifetime. 
2. Life expectancy rule-base withdrawals on life expectancy.  The main problem for 
this rule is that 50% of people will outlive their savings. 
3. The 4% percent rule-retirees would withdraw 4% a ye r.  This results in an 
inefficient outcome with significant wealth at date of death. 
Milevsky, Moore and Young (2006) develop a model that mathematically computes the optimal 
amount a person should annuitize their investment at retirement.  Obviously, the changes in the 
assumptions influence the results. 
Scott (2012) shows that implementing a longevity annuity into the distribution phase can change 
the spending curve for a retiree.  Since the tail end of longevity is now covered, a person can 
spend more in the early years, since they have paid a premium to insure their later years in life by 
purchasing the longevity annuity.  He concludes that t e longevity annuity is the optimal decision 
for those unwilling to annuitize the full amount ofretirement income.  Sexauer, Pesking and 
Cassidy (2012) create a portfolio where 88% of the portfolio is based upon a TIPs investment and 
12% on a longevity annuity in order to create a reason ble distribution pattern at retirement. 
The longevity annuity provides a useful tool that embodies what the ultimate purpose of 
insurance should be and that is to provide peace of mind for outlier events.  Today’s defined 
47 
 
benefit plans provide full coverage (rather than tail coverage), and defined contribution plans 
provide no coverage.  The hybridization model attempts to bridge the gap between the two types 
of plans and avoid the behavioral obstacles found in today’s annuity market when it is left to the 
consumer to make the choice. 
Description of Hybridization Model 
Retirement benefits are delivered in two different fashions which are called defined benefit and 
defined contribution.  Defined benefit plans provide a predetermined formula for a benefit at 
retirement that is guaranteed by the sponsor of the plan.  The benefit is also not subject to 
employees’ whims of whether they participate in the plan.  It is mandated.  A defined contribution 
plan, however, provides a predetermined contribution to the retirement plan with no guarantee of 
a benefit at retirement.  In the defined benefit plan, the plan sponsor is responsible for two major 
risks, investment return and longevity.  In the defined contribution plan, these risks shift to  
individual participant.   
As had been shown earlier, there has been a dramatic ove to shift defined contribution plans 
across the United States.  In these designs the define  contribution plan originally was used as a 
supplement to the defined benefit plan.  However, in recent years, the plans are now the 
predominant source of income for participants. 
A typical defined benefit design would guarantee a lifetime annuity at retirement for a person, 
generally based upon their pay at that time.  Originally, it was designed to meet a predetermined 
target, such as 70% of final pay for the rest of a person’s life.  This traditional design allows for a 
simple way to provide a benefit to people that hitsa arget.  Most employees, however, took these 
designs for granted during their working lifetime as there was no simple way to communicate the 
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value of the benefit.  Once a person retired, however, the monthly check that came was easily 
appreciated and valued, much like Social Security.  Over time, many additional features were 
added that included a preretirement death benefit, disability benefits, and cost of living 
adjustments.  As these benefits are added, further costs are created due to the fact that people did 
not receive these benefits in the past. 
To further complicate matters, the plans were redesign d to accommodate a workforce that was 
more transient.  It did not make sense to provide an xample 70% benefit to a person who might 
have only worked five years with an employer.  These plans were adjusted to allow for accruals 
to match the working career of the participants.  In this case, if a person worked a limited time 
frame with an employer would only earn a prorated portion of the final targeted benefit.    
The next evolution of pension plans involved what is essentially a transfer of longevity risk and 
also an easier form of communication to participants.  Plans began to offer a lump sum payment 
instead of an annuity for the person’s lifetime.  Under federal law, however, the plan could not 
eliminate the annuity and could only offer the lump sum as an additional optional form.  Retirees 
found it easier to understand a $200,000 lump sum versus a $1,500 per month annuity at age 65.  
It may also be obvious that the retiree may appreciat  the $200,000 lump sum more since the 
dollar amount seems so much greater than the $1,500 annuity regardless of the fact that they are 
actuarially equivalent.  Participants, however, may not understand that they have now accepted 
both investment risk and longevity risk with the lump sum. 
Defined contribution plans, on the other hand, are very simply designed.  In general, they are 
composed of two different types of contributions, the employee and the employer.  The employer 
either provides a contribution contingent upon the employee contributing (known as a match) or 
as a discretionary contribution regardless of the participant’s actions.  The participants know the 
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value of their account on a daily basis.  While theemployer may design their portion of the 
contribution to target a final result at retirement, there is no guarantee that the target will be met 
as the returns along with the contribution rate actu lly determine the benefit.  Participants, 
however, do not have a very good basis for determining whether the account balances provide for 
a sustainable retirement in their latter years. 
When the retirement systems are put together today, the  produce a pattern of distribution which 
begin at retirement until the participant dies.  Both the defined benefit plan and defined 
contribution plan start payments at retirement with no apparent connection in pattern with each 
other.  Another way to provide the benefit stream is contrasted below with the current system to 
show how the systems could work in sync with each other in a different hybridized model: 
Figure 6 
 




The hybrid approach looks very similar to a longevity annuity by providing the backstop of a 
guaranteed income stream that begins when a person reaches age 85 that is designed to be a 
defined benefit approach.  The longevity annuity is generally designed to be purchased at 
retirement at the choice of the participant.  The hybridized system, however mandates a defined 
benefit plan for the tail purposes and a defined contribution plan approach for the early years of 
retirement in order to complement each other and provide a sustainable retirement to the person.  
This avoids the behavioral choice of the annuity through its mandated approach, and also reduces 
the risk to the employer since the risk of the approach is a fraction of the defined benefit 
approach.  The employee benefits through a structured decumulation phase with the tail of their 
retirement covered by the defined benefit plan.   
The model would be designed as follows: 
Overall, a target replacement percentage would be det rmined for the full retirement stream.  In 
this paper, we will attempt to replicate a 30% pay replacement for a 30 year employee.  The 
typical pension plan that would produce this type of revenue stream would be a 1% three year 
final average pay times service plan.  The target of a 1% three year final average pay plan 
generally produces a funding cost of approximately 6% of pay as will be tested in the report.  We 
will call this base model “DB” only.   
The second model will be the defined contribution plan.  This plan will be designed around the 
same cost structure as the “DB” only plan.  We willthen test and reconfigure the benefit to be a 
new comparability design where the actual contribution in total will be the same as the “DB” only 
design, but the allocation will be based upon the ag  of the participant to drive a similar 30% pay 
replacement for a 30 year employee.  Essentially younger employees will receive a smaller 
51 
 
benefit than older employers to account for the geometric progression of the compounding of 
interest. 








The term on the left hand side of the equation denotes the life annuity, and the right hand size 
represents the time valued payment stream of $1 per year adjusted by the probability of death.  
This equation can be broken into two pieces, one which reflects a temporary annuity, still 
adjusted for death and the addition of deferred annuity which picks up payment after the 
temporary period expires.  In this example the age is 65 at which payments begin, with a 20 year 
deferral period.  The following equation shows the formulation: 
 =	:|	+		| 
The follow table shows the actuarial computations for each component using a 4.5% interest rate 







 Life Annuity at 65 Temporary Annuity 
from 65 to 85 
Deferred Annuity 
Beginning at 85 
Present value of $1 
annual payment 
12.6 11.4 1.2 
Percentage of life 
annuity 
100% 90% 10% 
Hybrid system Total Hybrid DC portion DB portion 
 
The formal model is now presented with each component pieces below allowing for the basic 


















6% of Pay None None 6% of Pay 
DC Only None 6% of Pay 6% of Pay 6% of Pay 6% of Pay 
Hybrid 
















HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Hypotheses 
H1.  Since the hybrid model combines the traditional DB only and DC only models, the hybrid 
model will provide smaller contribution volatility for the employer compared to the traditional 
defined benefit approach. 
H2.  The hybrid model provides a stacked distribution pattern which will reduce the probability of 
ruin for participants as compared to a traditional defined contribution approach. 
H3.  They hybrid model provides a more efficient distribution pattern for participants with the 
result that participants’ balances at date of death are less than those using the 4% rule. 
Hybrid Model and Effect on Plan Sponsor 
Actuaries are trained in the mathematics of life contingencies and risk theory as the basis of the 
models that are used for life insurance, annuities, car insurance, health care insurance and 
pensions.  This forms the basis for the methodology.  Greene (1963) questioned whether a theory 
was appropriate on risk and mentioned there is no the ry of insurance.  He produced surveys on 
risk and found that people did understand risk to some extent was not able to affirmatively show 
whether this affected their desire to purchase insurance.   Borch (n.d.) furthered the  
54 
 
concept with the help of utility theory and applied it to insurance and reinsurance to understand 
whether an insurance company should pay premium and cede risk.  Under typical utility theory, 
the company should only cede a very little amount of risk in order to maximize their expected 
profit, but Borch moves on to discuss collective risk and the probability of ruin to further enhance 
the company’s prospects to avoid ruin. 
Classical risk theory is summarized by Debaen and Haezondonck(1987) and tested for inflation 
and interest.  Risk theory encompasses a random amount of random variables and tests for the 
ultimate probability of ruin for an insurance company by examining the company’s surplus.  This 
is analogous to a self-insured pension plan which guarantees annuities and the possibility of 
bankruptcy with complete liquidation of assets. Furthe ing this work is Paulsen (1993) who used 
a stochastic process for inflation and return.  Probabilities of ruin were able to be determined 
under various different assumptions. 
In 2008, Kasas, Goovaertsz, Dhaene, summarized actuarial risk theory in its current forms 
including models on utility theory, individual versus collective risk, ruin theory, premium 
systems and credibility theory.  These topics form the basis of actuarial pricing of product. 
Exley, Mehta and Smith (1997) take basic risk theory, and also typical pricing models of actuarial 
science, include concepts from Modigliani and Miller (1958) to introduce a market based 
valuation system for funding pensions.  This included valuing pensions as bond like instruments 
and utilizing a spot rate approach to the interest rates in measuring the cash flows. 
The analysis for the dissertation will be performed using census information from a corporate 
entity which sponsors a pension plan for the corporate analysis.  The calculations will include 
measures utilizing Pension Protection Act methodology and ASC 715 accounting methods for the 
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corporate member.  The reason for utilizing different methods is to introduce a level of robustness 
into the calculations to ascertain whether the methodology could produce different results.  The 
analysis will include projections of future costs for the next twenty years with both a 
deterministic model and a stochastic model, utilizing Winklevoss’s Proval actuarial system and 
the methods described by Winklevoss in performing the projections per Winklevoss (1982). 
The corporate illustration involves a $3 billion company that provides a pension to its employees.  
The census information has the following characteris ics: 
3,863 Active Employees Average service of 13.7 years 
Average age of 47.8 Average pay of $56,912 
The corporate data utilizes actual census characteristics of an agricultural entity which has 
provided defined benefit accruals to its participants over 40 years and also provided defined 
contribution allocations during the last 20 years. 
In order to calculate a necessary contribution to fund the benefit, an actuarial funding method 
must be chosen.  Trowbridge (1979) discusses the numerous funding methods available, which 
each treat prior service and future service benefits d fferently, and allocate costs to different 
timeframes.  The Pension Protection Act (PPA) methodology utilizes a pure unit credit approach.  
This approach creates units for each year of service and allocates costs based upon these units for 
persons actively accruing a benefit.  The amount a person earns in a single year is called the 
normal cost.  This is calculated by measuring the present value of the benefit earned at the end of 
the year, and subtracting the present value of the benefit as of the beginning of the year.  The 
present value of all past normal costs are known as the accrued liability.  The accrued liability is 
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measured against the market value of assets to determine if the plan is underfunded or 
overfunded.  The Pension Protection Act methodology also provides a system to calculate the 
contributions.  The system involves a combination of the normal cost and a method to amortize 
the unfunded accrued liability.  Under this method, the unfunded state is amortized over seven 
years, and re-measured each year. 
For ASC 715 purposes, an alternative form of the unit credit method is utilized and is called the 
projected unit credit funding method.  The basis for the calculation is very similar to unit credit, 
with both a normal cost and an accrued liability being generated.  However, the method calls for 
using pay at retirement in the calculations if the benefit is based upon a formula that is in some 
form a final average pay.  This projected pay is reid nt within both the normal cost and the 
accrued liability.  Under this method, the liabilities calculated are generally higher than those 
under a pure unit credit approach.  The method for calculating the cost under ASC 715 purposes, 
includes a normal cost component (also called the service cost), an interest cost based upon the 
liability, an expected return on assets figure (which offsets the interest cost on the liability) and 
amortization components to pay off the unfunded liability over time.  An interesting result that 
can occur under ASC 715 accounting is the possible presence of an income generation due to an 
overfunded pension plan.  This cannot occur under th  PPA methodology as the contribution is 
lower bounded at zero. 
It is important to understand the typical valuation process and the underlying assumptions behind 
the calculations.  The valuation process essentially discounts future benefit payments under a 
number of contingent events.  Certainly, interest rates and life expectancy figure into the 
computation.  Also, other decrements are included to essentially quantify the value of the benefit 
at retirement.  This process involves calculations that are made for each individual person in the 
valuation and discounts the benefit from the last possible age that benefits can be received (which 
57 
 
is assumed to be age 110 under most tables) to our current time period.  Since the age at which 
people die, quit, become disabled, etc., are unknown, the process involves making actuarial 
assumptions regarding each contingency and accounting for the cost. 
The assumptions utilized under these methods are shr d except for the funding methods and the 
interest rates.  The interest rates will be based upon the rules that are currently in place for each 
methodology.  For the corporate funding analysis, the rates will be the mandated IRS rates as of 
January 1, 2012.  These rates are a 24 month average of corporate bond yields of differing 
durations.  The rates are set for three different sgments of the yield curve.  The first segment 
represents the rates between zero and five years for the period.  The second segment represents 
the rates between six and twenty years.  The final segment rate is for the years twenty one and 
above. 
For ASC 715 purposes, the rates generally approximate the rate at which the obligation can be 
settled.  In practice, the rates are similar to Moody AA corporate bond yields, or a Citibank yield 
curve.  A singular rate can be calculated from the yield curve to approximate the whole pattern.  
However, the rate must be used as of the date of the settlement, rather than a blending. 
The next set of assumptions is the mortality tables, or the rate at which people decease.  The 
Internal Revenue Service provided the 2008 table, and annually adjusts the table for mortality 
improvement.  While the actuarial valuation process includes projections for the future, it is not 
required to account for future mortality improvement.  The valuation for this report will not 

















20 .000206 .000124 45 .001059 .000727 
25 .000287 .000141 50 .001309 .001055 
30 .000388 .000201 55 .001805 .002034 
35 .000675 .000352 60 .003156 .003433 
40 .000869 .000409 65 .005175 .005084 
 
A large difference between defined benefit plans and defined contributions is the ability of the 
defined benefit plan to account for future terminations of employment prior to actual termination 
and appropriately discount the actuarial costs for this contingency.  If a person is vested in the 
benefit, meaning they own the benefit and terminates employment, the cost is accounted for in the 
valuation.  If the person is not vested, the cost is zero and is immediately recognized in the 
valuation.  The withdrawal rates are based upon the population and summarized below: 





20 .25 45 .05 
25 .20 50 .025 
30 .15 55 .0 
35 .10 60 .0 
40 .075 65 .0 
 
The next important assumption involves the rate at which people retire.  These rates reflect the 
experience of the population.  It is typical to seea large increase in early retirements at age 62 due 
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to the availability of Social Security.  It is assumed that once a person reaches age 65, they will 
retire regardless of their Social Security eligibility for full benefits. 
Table 7 Retirement Rates 
Age Retirement 
Rate 
Age Retirement Rate 
<=54 .00 60 .10 
55 .01 61 .05 
56 .01 62 .30 
57 .01 63 .15 
58 .01 64 .30 
59 .01 >=65 1.0 
 
As this valuation will include stochastic future scenarios for the next twenty years, it is important 
to ensure that the population does not waste away.  The following table includes the demographic 
makeup of the new employees that will join the plan sponsor.  The demographics match the 
current demographic employer and essentially ensures that the population makeup does not 
change in a significant fashion.  Whenever a person decrements the population in the future due 
to death, retirement or termination of employment, a new person replaces them in the fashion 
outlined below.  As the weights constitute partial replacement, the new entrant is essentially 
spread among the age groups. 
Table 8 New Entrant Profile 
Age Percent Male Salary Weight 
25 80% $30,000 10% 
30 80% $40,000 20% 
35 80% $45,000 20% 
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40 80% $50,000 20% 
45 80% $55,000 20% 
50 80% $60,000 20% 
 
The following table summarizes the assumptions and the methodology that will be employed in 
the projection of costs.  As the table shows, the major changes involve the interest rates and the 
funding methods.  The additional methodologies should provide some level of robustness check 
on the different scenarios that will be modeled. 
Table 9 Summarization of Assumptions and Methodology 
 PPA Methodology ASC 715 
Funding Method True Unit Credit Projected Unit 
Credit 
Interest Rate IRS Table – 
24-Month Average 
Spot Market Rate 
Mortality Table Current Mortality Current Mortality 
Withdrawal Rates Sponsor Rate Sponsor Rate 
Retirement Rates Sponsor Rate Sponsor Rate 
 
Scenario Projections 
The methodology will include running various scenarios under each type shown above.  
These scenarios will be run in a deterministic and stochastic fashion.  Under a 
deterministic projection, the liabilities are calculated on an expected basis using actuarial 
methodology.  The assets, however, will be modeled stochastically per Winklevoss 
(1982) utilizing Morgan, J.P. (2014) capital market assumptions.  The pension will be 
funded with an asset mixture composed of 60% equity, 40% fixed income.  Specifically, 
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the mix is 20% long term government bonds, 20% long term corporate bonds, 20% US 
large cap equity, 20% US small cap equity and 20% international. 
The J.P Morgan (2014) capital market assumptions (nomi al) include the following 
extracts: 
 
Table 10 Long Term Capital Market Assumptions 
 Expected Return Standard Deviation 
Inflation 2.26% 1.50% 
Long Government 4.11% 13.50% 
Long US Corporate 5.67% 12.00% 
US Large Cap Equity 8.49% 14.75% 
US Small Cap Equity 9.24% 19.75% 
International 9.01% 16.75% 
 
There has been much literature written concerning the proper way to fund the pension plans due 
to Pension Benefit Guaranty constraints, utility of firms, risk of bankruptcy etc. per Ang and Lai 
(1988).  Models using different bond and equity measures (Huang and Cairns 2006, Rauh 2013) 
are one variable, but so is the actuarial funding policy (Asthana 1999) which is necessary in the 
projections.  For the benefit of the analysis, we will use the minimum contributions under each 
method tested for PPA, ASC and GASB. 
For this paper, we will examine numerous measures to analyze the effectiveness of the design. As 
this section focuses on the effects on the employer, th  volatility of the contribution will be the 




 1. The numerator will be the standard deviation of the contribution 
stream in each year under the proposed design. 
 2. The denominator will be the standard deviation f the 
contribution stream for our normative value, the “DB” only design. 
Hybrid Model and Effect on Plan Participant 
In order to test the effects on a plan participant, we will use similar stochastic methods to 
determine the individual results.  The comparison pints will be calculating a probability of ruin 
under collective risk theory as described above.  A participant’s account balance will be modeled 
at retirement age (age 65) and tested against two different scenarios assuming either an inflation 
adjusted 4% payment stream (the 4% rule) or an inflat on adjusted 5% payment stream (the 5% 
rule). 
The first scenario will be a typical defined contribution approach.  A stochastic modeling (using 
the same Morgan, J. P. (2014) capital market assumptions) under an uncertain lifetime will be 
analyzed using current mortality rates (RP 2000 projected) and the probability of ruin will be 
calculated for the defined contribution plan.  This will be run under a combination of software 
packages including Proval to model the portfolios. 
The second scenario will model the hybridized approach and stochastically model the same 
portfolio.  The probability of ruin will also be cal ulated under this scenario and ultimately be 
compared to the first scenario. 
The scenarios will be tested using a portfolio comprised of a 25% long government fund, 25% 
long corporate bond fund, 20% US large cap equity fund, 20% small cap equity fund and 10% 
international fund.  One thousand test asset scenarios will be stochastically modeled over a 40 
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year time frame.  Each thousand scenarios will be run another thousand sequences with mortality 









The first set of results will focus on the impact for the employer in implementing the hybrid 
model.  In order to avoid any initial underfunding issues, it was assumed to have the assets equal 
the liability at plan inception.  The contributions that were received by the plan were according to 
the IRS minimum under the Pension Protection Act.  Each set of charts will show both the 
defined benefit only option and the hybrid plan.  The hybrid plan costs reflect the defined benefit 





Table 11 DB Assets Only 
  
Table 12 Hybrid (DB Only) 
    
   
Tables 11 and 12 show the asset projections stochasti ally projected for twenty years.  Since the 

































approximately 10% of the liability of the traditional defined benefit that begins payment at age 
65.  Hence, the asset projections show the same type of relationship at least in the early years. 
Table 13 Nominal Compounded Asset Return for Defined B nefit Only 
   
Table 14 Nominal Compounded Asset Return for Hybrid 


















































































































Tables 13 and 14 show the compounded annual returns on a nominal basis.  The mean return for 
the defined benefit only plan was 8.3% per year with a 11.9% standard deviation.  The mean 
return for the hybrid plan was the same.  The means were calculated over the twenty year time 
horizon. 
Table 15 Employer Contribution to Defined Benefit Only 
 
Table 16 Employer Contribution to Hybrid Plan 














































































































Tables 15 and 16 show the stark disparity in costs between the two programs.  The hybrid 
approach includes the defined contribution program.  Since the liabilities are deterministically 
valued using a static interest rate provided by the Pension Protection Act, the costs may have 
been initially inflated under actuarial valuation methodology.  Since the returns from the portfolio 
average 8.3% over the long term, the plan becomes ov rfunded when measured against the static 
rate for the 50%.  This results in zero contributions around the 2025 and 2026 for both plans.  It 
should also be noted that since both plans began with assets to match the prior service costs, an 
environment which produces asset gains will leverag the contribution to zero fairly quickly.  
This is seen at the 5th and 25th percentiles. 
 Table 17 Employer Contribution to Defined Benefit Only % of Pay 


















Table 18 Employer Contribution to Hybrid % of Pay 
  
The percentage of pay contribution levels for funding the plan produce indicative results 
regarding the volatility of contribution levels.  For the defined benefit only plan, the 95% 
produces costs in excess of 12% of pay which is double the original intended cost of the plan.  
The hybrid plan produces costs of 7.0% of pay at the long end of the 95th percentile.  One way to 
show the difference in volatility is to see that the 95th percentile increases costs over 6% of pay 
for the defined benefit only plan, while the hybrid only produces a 1% increase of cost at that 
level.  From an employer perspective, the reduction in volatility is a favorable result. 
The mean for the defined benefit plan only as a percentage of pay was 4.2% with a standard 
deviation of 4.3%.  The mean for the hybrid plan as a percentage of pay was 0.38% of pay with a 



















Table 19 Underfunding Defined Benefit Only 
   































Underfunding for pensions is defined to be the difference between the assets of the plan and the 
liabilities.  Tables 19 and 20 measure the differences using the Pension Protection methods, 
versus a termination liability (or a direct market measurement) which could show significantly 
worse results.  While the underfunding of the plan may not cause the plan to be in jeopardy of 
paying benefits to the participants, there is no question that the underfunded status affects the 
financial value of the firm in the market’s eyes.  In many cases, such as the airlines and steel 
mills, the underfunding of their pension plans jeopardized the survival of the firms as also 
previously noted by Studebaker.  As expected, the charts show that the hybrid plan is much less at 
risk of having significant underfunded status in relationship to the size of the plan sponsor.   


















Table 22 Funding Percentage Hybrid 
  
The funding percentage charts show the unfunded status in relationship to the liabilities.  The 
percentage is calculated with assets in the numerator and liabilities in the denominator with 
percentages over 100% reflecting an overfunded plan.  As the charts detail, the overfunded 
percentages tend to have high numbers at the 95% percentile, while the plans are not projected to 
fall in the low funded percentage ranges.  This result is deceiving, since plans that are 
underfunded are required by the actuarial methodology to fund faster thus filling the gaps 
quickly, whereas the overfunding of the plan may continue unabated with no mechanism to 
reduce the rate of overfunding.  The hybrid plan does not appear to have the same upside position 
as the defined benefit only design, primarily due to lack of leveraging that may occur due to their 





















Table 23 Pension Expense Defined Benefit Only 
   































As opposed to funding methods where the interest rates used for actuarial liability measurement 
and techniques of amortization are one and the same, pension accounting uses a different 
methodology.  Liabilities are measured using a market ate at which the liability could be settled 
and assets are measured using a long term rate.  This creates scenarios where the pension expense 
could be a negative figure and actually provides financial income to the plan sponsor.  Plan 
sponsors have limited ability to tap into this from a cash stand point therefore the measurement 
may be somewhat meaningless, however the rule remains.  Tables 23 and 24 show the wide range 
of results for pension expense along with the 5th percentile possibility of income generation.  The 
limited volatility of the hybrid plan is striking. 
Table 25 Pension Expense % of Pay Defined Benefit Only Plan 

































































































Table 26 Pension Expense % of Pay Hybrid Plan 
  
  Both Tables 25 and 26 take the pension expense hard dollars and convert them to a 
percentage of pay similarly to the funding contributions.  The results are similar in nature, with a 
reduction in cost over time as the asset returns exceed the valuation interest rates.   
Table 27 Defined Benefit Only PBO Funded Ratio 


















































































































Table 28 Hybrid PBO Funded Ratio 
   
The accounting concept of Projected Benefit Obligation or PBO, takes into account the salary 
assumption through retirement date.  This inflates the liability measurement as future pay is 
accounted for directly.  The result of this change increases the liability measurement as compared 
to the Pension Protection Act true unit credit approach for liabilities.  Ultimately, the funded 
ratios are reduced for both the plans because of this measurement change. 
Tables 11 through 28 summarize the projected liabilities and assets for the two defined benefit 
designs.  Tables 29 and 30 show the pension efficiency ratios calculated by year for the cash 



















Table 29 Pension Efficiency Ratio –Cash Contribution % of Pay 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
σ  Hybrid 0 0.21% 0.24% 0.26% 0.28% 0.30% 0.33% 0.35% 0.36% 0.38% 
σ DB 0 3.20% 3.61% 3.85% 4.04% 4.26% 4.46% 4.58% 4.60% 4.63% 
PER N/A 6.56% 6.64% 6.75% 6.93% 7.04% 7.34% 7.64% 7.83% 8.21% 
 
Year 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
σ  Hybrid 0.39% 0.41% 0.43% 0.45% 0.46% 0.48% 0.49% 0.51% 0.52% 0.54% 
σ DB 4.68% 4.71% 4.73% 4.81% 4.75% 4.76% 4.77% 4.86% 4.81% 4.91% 
PER 8.33% 8.70% 9.09% 9.36% 9.68% 10.0% 10.3% 10.5% 10.8% 11.0% 
 
Table 30 Pension Efficiency Ratio –Pension Expense % of Pay 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
σ  Hybrid 0 0.09% 0.13% 0.16% 0.18% 0.19% 0.21% 0.21% 0.23% 0.25% 
σ DB 0 1.33% 1.37% 1.87% 2.05% 2.32% 2.62% 2.75% 2.99% 3.27% 
PER N/A 6.77% 7.65% 8.55% 8.78% 8.19% 8.01% 7.64% 7.69% 7.65% 
 
Year 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
σ  Hybrid 0.28% 0.32% 0.37% 0.41% 0.46% 0.50% 0.57% 0.62% 0.67% 0.75% 
σ DB 3.69% 4.14% 4.56% 4.97% 5.39% 5.71% 6.27% 6.50% 6.83% 7.30% 




Hypothesis 1 addressed the volatility of pension plan contributions of the hybrid plan relative to 
the defined benefit only design.  The pension effici n y ratios are shown for each year of each 
1,000 trials for each design.  They range from a low of 6.56% to a high of 11.0%.  This means 
that the volatility for the hybrid design is a fraction of the defined benefit plan and supportive of 
Hypothesis 1. 
The next series of charts show the stochastic results from the participant’s perspective utilizing a 
fixed asset mix and multiple withdrawal patterns.  The purchase of the deferred annuity was 
chosen to be 10% based upon the relationship shown in Table 3, the value of the deferred to age 
85 portion relative to the full annuity.  The stochastic mortality was modeled upon male mortality 
using the adjusted RP 2000 mortality table.  The charts display the distribution of the probabilities 
of ruin.  The probability of ruin has been expanded to encompass two types of ruin for the 
deferred annuity purchase.  The definition is total ruin with this case comprising the possibility a 
person deceases with no future income possibilities.  The second definition is some ruin with the 
case of a person experiencing ruin in the account balance portfolio, but will still live to a point 
where they will receive some income from a deferred annuity in the future.  For example, the 
person may experience ruin at age 82, begin a payment of the deferred annuity at age 85 and 
deceases at a later point.  This was important to isolate since many annuity contracts allow for an 








Table 31 4% Rule Probability of Ruin 
 
 
Table 32 4% Deferred Annuity Purchase, Total Ruin 
   
   
Table 33 4% Rule Probability of Some Ruin 











































































































The 4% rule scenarios show a variety of results based upon whether the deferred annuity is 
purchased.  The probability of ruin centers at a nomi al 1.53% without a deferred annuity being 
bought.  However, the probability of total ruin, using the same payment stream is a negligible 
0.11%.  There is a higher 0.50% chance of partial ruin, however this risk can be completely 
mitigated with the possibility of advanced payment of the annuity at a reduced amount. 
Table 34 5% Rule Probability of Ruin 
   
Table 35 5% Deferred Annuity Purchase, Total Ruin 
   
   







































     Table 36 5% Rule Probability of Some Ruin 
   
The 5% rule was modeled with the same portfolios as the 4% rule.  The probability of ruin 
increased from 1.53% to 5.82%.  The probability of total ruin using a deferred annuity in the 5% 
rule was 0.91% as opposed to the 0.11% in the 4% rule.  The probability of some ruin for the 5% 
rule with a deferred annuity purchase equaled 3.44% as opposed to the 0.50% seen in the 4% rule.    
Table 37 Probability of Ruin 
Scenario µ σ 
4% Rule                    1.53%                0.34% 
4% Rule, DA Some Ruin                    0.50%                0.16% 
4% Rule, DA Total Ruin                     0.11%                0.09% 
5% Rule                     5.82%                  0.62% 
5% Rule, DA Some Ruin                     3.44%                  0.42% 
5% Rule, DA Total Ruin                      0.91%                  0.27% 
 
Table 37 shows the probabilities of ruin side by side along with their respective volatilities.  The 





















































lower probability of ruin as compared to the typical strategy of the 4% rule.  The volatilities under 
the deferred annuity purchase are lower as well. 




 Account Balance 









Chart 38 shows the residual balances at death under each scenario assuming full payment through 
death using 1000 trials.  Ruin balances were considered to be zero.  Residual balances may be 
appropriate for estate planning purposes, however, for efficiency purposes it also denotes that a 
person may have been able to spend more dollars during their retirement years as the money 
becomes worthless to a dead person.  These results support Hypothesis 3 that the annuity 









As might be expected, the analysis on the employer when implementing the hybrid approach 
causes a significant reduction in risk from a volatility standpoint.  Generally, employers are very 
concerned about providing a retirement plan that does not vary in cost, hence the trend towards 
defined contribution plans.  The contributions under the Pension Protection Act methodology 
produce a much lower top end when implementing the hybrid plan.  For example, the hybrid plan 
began at a 5.9% contribution level and ended at the 95% percentile twenty years into the future at 
a 7.0% contribution level.  Contrast that result with the defined benefit only plan design with an 
initial contribution at the 6% of pay level.  After twenty years, the 95th percentile shows a more 
than doubling of the contribution to the 13% of pay level, which is a significant increase.  
Corporations would generally not be as concerned with a cost that varies at the 1% of pay level, 
but a volatility of 7% of pay produces a different reaction. 
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The possible underfunding of the plan over time is a hindrance to many companies wanting to 
maintain defined benefit plans.  The possible use of the hybrid approach would mitigate these 
fears since the size of the liability is not projected to grow to the same levels as would be 
expected for a traditional approach.  The hybrid plan produces an underfunding level of 
approximately $21,000,000 at the 95% level as opposed to approximately $135,000,000 for the 
defined benefit plan.  This has been measured in the 20th year of projection.  As underfunded 
liabilities affect both the balance sheet and the future contributions of the plan it would be 
imperative to avoid this possibility.  The funded ratio normalizes the relationship of assets to 
liabilities.  The hybrid plan is projected to have 180% funding at the 95% percentiles in twenty 
years and the 200% funded level for the defined benefit only.  These levels show possible upside, 
but the downside may be limited due to the presence of heavy contributions to mitigate the 
underfunded status. 
  The accounting measures show similar type of results for the similar aspects that are 
being measured.  The pension expense number is similar to the contribution figure except the 
expense may go negative to provide an income to the plan sponsor.  The expense became 11% of 
payroll at the 95th percentile for the defined benefit plan only, and 6.9% of pay for the hybrid 
plan, both at the 20th year.  The 5% scenarios at year 20 show income of 13% of pay for the 
defined benefit only and a cost of 4.25% of pay for the hybrid.   While this shows high upside, in 
reality the plan sponsor cannot spend the pension income as it’s a non cash item.  Overall, the 
positions show favorable results for companies due to the reduction in volatility in costs and 
limitations on downside for the underfunding.  This design is superior to the defined benefit only 
design. 
  The models showing the effect on the participants display an unexpected result.  First, the 
model provides a framework for testing stochastic mortality against standard withdrawal patterns 
for retirement.  Models have generally assumed average lifespans, fixed lifespans, and perpetuity 
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spans.  This model expands knowledge through the stochastic modeling of longevity.   Secondly, 
the model tests the effect of purchasing a deferred annuity, and its ability to reduce the probability 
of ruin for annuitants.  Finally, the model shows whether the withdrawal pattern is efficient in 
utilization of dollars by quantifying the remaining balance at death. 
  The model implementing the 4% withdrawal rule shows a small probability of ruin of 
1.53%.  This is in line with other studies that propose the 4% rule due to its low risk nature.  
Should someone use 10% of their account balance to purchase a deferred annuity and still 
maintain the same 4% withdrawal rate, the probability of total ruin drops to an infinitesimal 
0.11% rate.  As mentioned earlier, a person could experience ruin prior to age 85, but have 
purchased an annuity and survived past age 85.  This is the case for the concept of some ruin and 
the rate is 0.50%.  Many retirees would certainly fear this event.  This risk is mitigated by the 
ability to have a rider on the annuity contract allowing for early withdrawals at a reduced rate.  
This is similar to early retirement reductions for pension plans, and the early retirement reduction 
for social security.  Purchasing a contract with this feature would completely eliminate the “some 
ruin” scenario.    It would appear to benefit the participant to purchase the deferred annuity 
versus simply applying the 4% rule since the risk of ruin is smaller. 
  This breeds a different question of whether a person can increase their withdrawal rate, 
purchase the deferred annuity and reduce their risk relative to the 4% rule.  The simulations show 
that the 5% rule produces a probability of ruin of 5.8%.  Total ruin while purchasing the deferred 
annuity under the 5% rule is 0.91%.  The some ruin amount is 3.44%.  The results indicate that a 
person could use a 5% withdrawal pattern, purchase a d ferred annuity and have lower total ruin 
risk than a person who simply applies the 4% rule.  This is a very interesting result as it contrary 
to the financial world’s current advice to retirees.  It also allows the opportunity for retirees to 
spend more money in their earlier retirement years, where the value of those dollars may be 
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greater than at the end of the retirement years.  While the some ruin probability may be higher at 
3.44%, the ability to purchase an annuity early would once again mitigate this risk. 
  Another result that can be ascertained is how effici nt is the distribution pattern?  A 
distribution pattern, which would produce a payout stream with $0 available on the date of death 
would seem to be idea (except for those with estate planning goals).  This can only be achieved 
by buying an immediate annuity with all dollars available at retirement.  Practically speaking, 
people are fairly loathe to making this purchase as has been discussed earlier in the paper.  In this 
paper, we calculate how efficient the payment pattern is by measuring how much of the person’s 
account balance is available on the date of death.  The lower the account balance, the higher the 
level of efficiency.  As can be seen on Result Chart 28, the deferred annuity choices are a more 
efficient use of retirement dollars.  Under the 5% rule with a deferred annuity, the account 
balances are the smallest, showing the highest level of fficiency but also with a corresponding 
higher level of risk. 
  Further research in this important topic is warranted due to the rapidly changing 
environment in retirement.  This study provides a basic framework in which to model retirement 
success differently than in the past by modeling mortality stochastically.  It would be important to 
model female mortality, increasing longevity patterns and different annuity purchase rates to 
quantify the difference in results.  It would also be interesting to test different deferral ages to 
determine if some sort of stacked deferred annuity purchases would produce better results.  It 
would also be important to add to the model a utility function that accounts for larger spending 
patterns at the early part of retirement along with smaller spending patterns at the back end, in 
order to simulate the reality of the utility of money for retirees. 
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1950’s and 1960’s.  These plans faced serious challenges, including a volatile financial system, a 
mobile workforce that did not remain with one employer during their career, and expensive 
government regulation.  As a result of these changes, corporate and public plan sponsors 
disallowed new entrants from entering the plan, or fr ze the plan or simply terminated the 
arrangement.  These plans eventually were replaced with defined contribution plans (named 





































This paper hopes to add to literature by modeling a new type of retirement program from the 
employer and employee’s perspective.  Given the current state of the world, with a decline in 
pension plans, a reliance on individual choices under uncertain outcomes and behavioral 
impediments to choosing the optimal path, a new style of retirement should be developed.  Under 
the new approach, which would limit the employer risk, improve financial outcomes for 
participants, and reduce large intergenerational transfers that may not be able to be maintained if 
the population does not grow.  This paper adds to knowledge by modeling stochastic results of 
mortality and its effects on distribution patterns, along with showing that a hybrid pension will 
reduce the risk for employers. 
Employers would see 90% reduction in cost volatility for pension plans, with the defined 
contribution approach providing much of the engine for the benefit.  Employees would see a 
better approach by having the ability to reduce their risk at retirement by purchasing a deferred 
annuity, but also possibly increasing their payment stream for the first 20 years.  A win-win 




 possible underfunding of the plan over time is a hindrance to many companies wanting to 
maintain defined benefit plans.  The possible use of the hybrid approach would mitigate these 
fears since the size of the liability is not projected to grow to the same levels as would be 
expected for a traditional approach.  The hybrid plan produces an underfunding level of 
approximately $21,000,000 at the 95% level as opposed to approximately $135,000,000 for the 
defined benefit plan.  This has been measured in the 20th year of projection.  As underfunded 
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The following charts depict the results of the stochastic simulations by asset class as a  
test after 1000 trials per year. 





Year Mean StdDev Mean StdDev 
1 2.30% 1.20% 0.00% 1.20% 
2 2.50% 1.30% 0.00% 1.20% 
3 2.50% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
4 2.60% 1.40% 0.10% 1.20% 
5 2.60% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
6 2.60% 1.40% 0.10% 1.20% 
7 2.60% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
8 2.60% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
9 2.60% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
10 2.60% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
11 2.60% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
12 2.60% 1.50% 0.00% 1.20% 
13 2.60% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
14 2.60% 1.40% 0.10% 1.20% 
15 2.70% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
16 2.60% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
99 
 
17 2.60% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
18 2.60% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
19 2.60% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
20 2.60% 1.50% 0.00% 1.30% 
21 2.70% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
22 2.60% 1.30% -0.10% 1.20% 
23 2.60% 1.40% 0.10% 1.20% 
24 2.60% 1.30% 0.00% 1.20% 
25 2.70% 1.40% 0.00% 1.20% 
26 2.70% 1.30% 0.00% 1.20% 
 
Appendix Chart 2-Projection of Stochastic Returns by Asset Class 
 LTGB Returns LTCorp 
Returns 
USL Returns USSM Returns INT Returns 
Year Mean StdD Mean StdD Mean StdD Mean StdD Mean StdD 
1 4.4% 14.0% 5.4% 12.3% 8.7% 15.7% 10.4% 21.2% 9.5% 17.8% 
2 5.2% 14.3% 6.8% 12.8% 10.5% 15.9% 12.6% 21.4% 11.3% 18.0% 
3 5.2% 14.2% 6.7% 12.6% 9.8% 15.9% 11.3% 21.4% 10.8% 18.0% 
4 6.1% 14.0% 7.0% 12.4% 9.8% 16.1% 10.9% 21.2% 10.7% 18.0% 
5 5.2% 14.3% 7.0% 12.9% 9.9% 15.3% 11.6% 20.7% 10.9% 17.7% 
6 5.5% 14.4% 7.1% 12.7% 10.2% 15.9% 11.8% 21.3% 11.3% 18.1% 
7 4.9% 14.3% 6.7% 12.5% 10.1% 15.8% 11.9% 21.3% 10.9% 18.0% 
8 4.8% 14.0% 6.2% 12.9% 9.9% 16.0% 11.5% 21.3% 10.5% 17.8% 
9 5.2% 14.1% 6.8% 12.5% 10.8% 15.5% 12.4% 20.9% 11.7% 17.4% 
10 5.2% 14.4% 6.6% 13.0% 10.1% 16.2% 11.6% 21.0% 10.7% 17.8% 
11 6.2% 14.6% 6.9% 13.1% 10.0% 16.2% 11.1% 21.6% 10.4% 18.2% 
12 5.4% 14.1% 6.7% 13.2% 10.0% 16.3% 11.1% 21.4% 10.8% 18.5% 
13 4.6% 13.7% 6.7% 12.8% 10.8% 16.0% 12.5% 21.0% 12.0% 18.3% 
14 5.5% 13.9% 7.6% 13.0% 11.0% 16.4% 13.3% 21.4% 12.2% 18.9% 
15 5.9% 13.9% 7.0% 12.9% 10.1% 16.1% 11.9% 21.4% 10.6% 17.8% 
16 5.5% 14.3% 6.9% 12.9% 10.4% 15.1% 11.7% 20.2% 11.2% 17.0% 
17 5.3% 14.1% 6.6% 12.8% 9.6% 15.4% 11.2% 20.3% 10.3% 17.5% 
18 5.9% 14.1% 7.0% 12.6% 9.7% 16.1% 11.5% 21.8% 10.7% 18.2% 
19 5.6% 14.4% 7.5% 12.9% 10.6% 16.0% 12.2% 20.9% 12.0% 18.2% 
100 
 
20 4.2% 14.3% 6.0% 13.1% 10.7% 15.9% 12.8% 21.4% 11.3% 18.1% 
21 5.8% 14.3% 7.3% 12.8% 10.4% 15.8% 12.2% 21.3% 11.1% 17.9% 
22 6.1% 13.5% 6.9% 12.3% 9.3% 15.8% 10.2% 20.9% 10.3% 17.9% 
23 5.5% 14.6% 7.4% 13.6% 11.2% 16.0% 12.8% 20.6% 12.1% 18.5% 
24 5.3% 14.6% 6.6% 12.9% 9.8% 15.7% 11.3% 20.9% 10.4% 17.8% 
25 5.6% 14.3% 7.0% 13.3% 10.2% 16.1% 12.2% 21.3% 10.7% 18.2% 
26 5.7% 14.7% 7.5% 12.7% 10.9% 16.1% 12.8% 21.9% 11.8% 18.5% 
27 5.4% 14.0% 6.8% 12.9% 10.1% 16.0% 11.3% 21.2% 11.1% 17.8% 
28 5.1% 15.1% 6.6% 13.1% 10.4% 16.6% 12.0% 21.8% 11.3% 18.7% 
29 5.1% 13.7% 6.6% 12.2% 10.9% 16.0% 12.7% 21.7% 11.6% 18.0% 
30 5.2% 14.5% 6.6% 13.3% 9.9% 16.4% 11.6% 21.7% 10.6% 18.4% 
31 4.2% 13.6% 6.2% 12.3% 10.6% 16.2% 12.8% 21.5% 11.1% 18.4% 
32 5.2% 13.8% 7.2% 12.7% 10.8% 16.1% 12.4% 21.7% 11.8% 18.5% 
33 5.1% 14.6% 6.6% 13.4% 10.1% 15.9% 11.3% 21.0% 11.3% 17.9% 
34 5.1% 14.5% 6.3% 12.6% 10.1% 16.3% 11.6% 22.0% 10.7% 18.3% 
35 5.8% 14.7% 6.8% 12.7% 9.8% 15.8% 11.1% 21.0% 10.3% 17.8% 
36 5.1% 14.2% 6.7% 13.1% 10.5% 16.0% 12.4% 21.5% 11.2% 18.2% 
37 5.3% 14.1% 7.0% 12.7% 10.4% 16.1% 12.3% 21.0% 11.4% 18.2% 
38 5.6% 14.6% 6.8% 12.9% 10.4% 15.6% 12.4% 20.8% 10.9% 17.7% 
39 5.0% 14.3% 6.7% 13.2% 10.6% 16.4% 12.6% 21.7% 11.1% 18.4% 
40 5.4% 14.6% 6.6% 12.7% 9.9% 15.2% 11.0% 19.8% 11.3% 17.7% 
41 5.2% 14.5% 6.5% 13.1% 10.7% 16.1% 12.3% 21.4% 11.4% 18.3% 
42 5.7% 14.2% 7.0% 12.7% 9.8% 16.3% 11.0% 21.0% 10.7% 18.5% 
43 4.9% 14.1% 6.2% 12.7% 10.2% 15.6% 11.5% 20.6% 11.2% 18.1% 
44 6.1% 13.9% 7.5% 12.2% 10.1% 16.4% 11.7% 21.7% 10.8% 18.6% 
45 5.1% 14.3% 6.6% 12.4% 10.0% 15.7% 11.5% 21.5% 11.1% 17.9% 
  
Appendix Chart 3-Correlations 
 
Nominal correlations: 
    
 
Inflation LTGB LTCorp USL USSM INT 
Inflation 1.00 0.29 0.36 0.41 0.38 0.39 
 LTGB 0.29 1.00 0.67 -0.18 -0.23 -0.17 
 LTCorp 0.36 0.67 1.00 0.38 0.39 0.46 
 USL 0.41 -0.18 0.38 1.00 0.92 0.90 
101 
 
 USSM 0.38 -0.23 0.39 0.92 1.00 0.83 
 INT 0.39 -0.17 0.46 0.90 0.83 1.00 
       Real correlations: 
     
 
Unex. Inf LTGB LTCorp USL USSM INT 
Unex. Inf 1.00 0.22 0.29 0.38 0.37 0.36 
 LTGB 0.22 1.00 0.65 -0.25 -0.30 -0.23 
 LTCorp 0.29 0.65 1.00 0.33 0.35 0.43 
 USL 0.38 -0.25 0.33 1.00 0.92 0.90 
 USSM 0.37 -0.30 0.35 0.92 1.00 0.82 
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